. Introduction
In De caelo ., Aristotle considers the questions whether it is legitimate to apply the principles "right" and "left" to "the body of the heaven" and if so in what manner to do so. This essay examines his attempt to answer those questions. The examination has three goals:
(a) to understand Aristotle's appeals to his conclusions about such "directional" principles in the De incessu animalium, and to assess his grounds for doing so, (b) to determine whether his assertion, during the course of this discussion, that "the heavens are ensouled and have a source of motion" (De caelo ., a-) plays a significant role in his argument, (c) to draw out some of the implications of this discussion for how we should understand the logical and explanatory structure of Aristotle's science (or philosophy) of nature.
I will contend that a significant epistemological problem lies behind the appeal to the De incessu in this passage, and that Aristotle was fully aware of it.
. Cosmic dimensions and cosmic directions
Aristotle's De caelo begins by declaring that the science of nature appears most of all to be concerned with bodies, magnitudes, their affections and their changes, but also with the first principles 1 of such substantial * History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh. 1 I will adopt the following policy for translating ρ : where it appears clearly to refer to the starting points of a science, I will use the term "principle"; where it appears to beings. 2 This claim rests on ontological grounds-things constituted by nature either are bodies and magnitudes, have body and magnitude, or are the first principles of things having body and magnitude (a-). Moreover, each of the natural bodies that constitute the cosmos is said to be complete in so far as it has all three of the dimensions of magnitude (π σας γ ρ ει τ ς διαστ σεις, b), i.e., in so far as it is divisible in length, breadth, and depth. Here, then, διαστ σις is naturally rendered "dimension" and refers to precisely what we designate by that English word. 3 At the beginning of the second book, after reviewing weaknesses in the arguments of those who deny that the heavens are eternal, Aristotle considers whether the right and the left are among the principles of natural bodies-an idea defended, we are there told, by the Pythagoreans. 4 Since there are some, such as those called Pythagoreans (for this is one of their statements), who claim there to be a certain right and left to the heavens, one should investigate whether this is so in the way they claim, or in some other way-if indeed one ought to apply these principles (τα τας τ ς ρ ς) to the body of the whole cosmos.
(b-) refer to the source or origin of a change of any kind, I will use the term "source. " A generic translation that could vaguely cover both ideas is "starting point. " Even with this policy, however, there are unavoidable problems. The notion of a scientific starting point harbors an ambiguity which one encounters in Aristotle's Greek and which renders the above distinction suspect-Aristotelian science is above all the identification of causes and the production of demonstrations from premises that identify the causes of the facts being demonstrated. So "scientific principle" may refer to the primary premises of a scientific demonstration or to the fundamental facts identified by those premises. And since some of those fundamental facts turn out to be the causes of those stated in the conclusion, the line between "principle" and "source" is not clear-cut. As the entries in Meta. .,  and  make abundantly clear, Aristotle was fully aware of this problem. 2 See Johansen (, -), for the significance of this starting point in understanding the relationship between the inquiry represented by Aristotle's De caelo and the very different project described in Plato's Timaeus.
3 This passage also includes an odd endorsement of the Pythagorean dictum that the all and everything are defined by threes, a claim that we take the number three from nature and make use of it in worship of the gods and a claim that the completeness of three is shown by the fact that the first time we say "all" (rather than "both") is when we refer to three items. I will take up later the question of why Aristotle stretches in these various ways for support of the idea that objects with these three dimensions of magnitude are complete objects, but for now it is enough to note that it is part of a set of wider epistemological questions raised by the method and style of the De caelo discussed in Robert Bolton's contribution to this volume.
